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IN DEFENSE OF AN UNSYSTEMATIC
SCIENCE OF LAW
MAX RADINt
A GROUP of sixteen persons were indiscreet enough to yield to the
honeyed persuasion of an eminent exponent of legal philosophy and
to contribute to a symposium called "My Philosophy of Law".' When
the book was published the title set in active motion all the obscure
complexes of three types of lawyers. The first included those who felt
it their duty to echo Dicey's peevish and unhistorical statement that
legal philosophy stank in the nostrils of common law'yers. The second
was made up of persons who feared that the wide use of philosophical
methods and ideas in law would compel them to think about the mean-
ing and function of the terms with which they dealt. And the third type
contained those many persons to whom philosophy is a kind of secluded
Elysium in which they hope to spend their days of contemplative retire-
ment when they have got rid completely of such sordid and mundane
things as Lawrence v. Fox and Pennoyer v. Neff. All these types are
represented in the reviews of the regrettably indiscreet volume already
mentioned, and often in the same reviewer.
It is gratifying that some at least of the gentlemen who undertook
to review the book were sufficiently free from these glandular dis-
turbances to get the idea that to state "a philosophy of law" was neither
wickedly presumptuous nor a silly waste of time nor un-American or
un-English. Speaking for one sixteenth of the authorship of the book,
I can only say that by "philosophy of law"- an abhorrent term that
should be discarded- I had nothing more pretentious in mind than
an attempt to set forth in order certain general considerations, supple-
menting and illustrating notions about the law which I have expressed
in one form and another for many years, most recently in the Storrs
lectures at Yale University in 1940, afterwards published as "Law as
Logic and Experience". 2
In that book, as elsewhere, I presented doctrines about la, ,-I delib-
erately do not say a doctrine - which, after examining a number of
the criticisms of the book as they appeared in reviews, I find no com-
pelling reason to abandon. Doubtless my presentation might well have
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2. The book has been very widely reviewed both in legal and other periodicals.
Most of the reviewers have been generous, perhaps to a fault. I am fully aware, how-
ever, that their expressions of commendation are not necessarily to be taken as complete
adherence to the views I have set forth.
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been better or more clearly phrased, because some reviewers understood
me to say things which I was astonished to find imputed to me and
for which, with due diligence, I can discover no basis in the text. When
I re-read what I then wrote, I think I can detach a few concepts more
general than most of the others, which for that reason I might call
"basic" and which it may not be inappropriate to list here. They are
the following:
1. Law is not a system of rules governing human conduct, Such
systems are the proper field of religion, ethics, economics, politics,
sociology and all other disciplines which consciously or unconsciously
value some examples of human behavior as better or worse than
others.
2. Law, therefore, has no real subject matter of its own except
its own procedure which assumes an independent value when, as
has been the case in most western states, law has become the
special interest of a group, more or less self-perpetuating, consisting
of technicians who develop a special terminology of their own of
which they are extremely jealous.
3. Law is the sum total of the generalizations derived from
judgments that a definite group of public officials, generally
judges or persons like judges, have made or are likely to make
about human behavior. These judgments are mediately or im-
mediately derived from the values created by these other disci-
plines. They are miscellaneous, casual, historically determined, in-
evitably contradictory and can only very imperfectly be arranged
under large generalizations, whether these generalizations are called
"principles" or "rules".
4. These generalizations imperfect, as they are, even so far
as the field of legal judgments is concerned, and subject, as they
are, to changes by inclusion and exclusion, are sufficiently stable
in any "system of law" to be the means of studying and expounding
"the law" and of justifying new judgments according to the ease
with which they can be fitted into the established generalization.
5. This la'tter fact is not of itself regarded as a sufficient justi-
fication for the judgment although it furnishes a basis of choice
when several judgments, all equally valid by the standards men-
tioned, are possible.
6. Legal judgments may exist - indeed, must exist - in com-
munities which have not, like most Western States, segregated a
group of judge-officials whose exclusive task it is to form such
judgments. In such communities it is often difficult to distinguish
legal from political, social and ethical judgments.
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7. Nonetheless, the distinction can with greater or less difficulty
be made in all communities. In Western communities, also, the
segregation of judicial officials is a comparatively recent historical
development and has never been absolute. Many legal judgments
have been continued from a pre-differentiated stage in the com-
munity's growth when they could have been called ethical and
social as much as legal.
8. Any particular legal judgment is phrased in terms of greater
or less generality. It is derived, however, from an actual or con-
jectural decision in a specific case in which an individual and unique
claim is granted or denied. Some method of legal analysis is useful
for stating the presence or absence of a claim and for breaking up
the general terms used into their constituent parts.
9. "The law" as a generalization of legal judgments is always
incomplete since it is always concerned with a specific question
not yet decided, as well as thousands already decided. The prognosis
of that decision involves an estimate in advance of the factors that
will determine the future judgment. In spite of the possible variety
and number of these factors, the advance estimate is so highly
probable in a number of cases that the statement of the law can
be made with a fair degree of certainty and precision, and no
decision will be required to test its accuracy since most men will
regard the decision as a foregone conclusion.
10. Decisions will consequently be called for chiefly in what
may be called marginal cases, in which prognosis is difficult and
uncertain. It is this fact that makes the entire body of legal judg-
ments seem less stable than it really is.
11. The determining time of judgments has nearly always been
the time at which the conflict of interests occurred which called
for judicial decision. This time is necessarily a past time and the
complete reconstruction of this past time, upon which the decision
must be based, is an obvious impossibility. The reconstruction can,
of course, be approximated but to a large extent is artificial and
is often created out of general patterns derived from recorded
experience.
12. It is possible in some cases to disregard the past element
and base the decision on a desirable prospective reorganization of
the relations of the parties affected, whether they are litigants
or not. That is the situation in certain types of judgments in which
large groups of commercial interests are simultaneously involved,
as in corporate reorganization, and also in cases in which economic
groups are in conflict, as in labor cases.
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13. It is very doubtful whether this method can be generally
extended to conflicts between individuals, since the prospective reor-
ganization demands the application of a scale of values less likely
to be generally acceptable than those used in order to redress past
wrongs.
14. The one value that can never be quite disregarded in any
legal judgment is the one based on an accepted sense of justice.
That the components of this sense of justice vary greatly in space
and time is demonstrable. But it is also demonstrable that, for
types of developed societies during a period of many centuries,
some of these constituents have been permanent.
15. Of these permanent constituents the notion that each
human bing is an end in himself, as expressed in the Kantian
formula, is perhaps the one most likely to be the nucleus of any
re-adaptation of the sense of justice to economic and social changes.
Out of it the values symbolized by the words liberty and brother-
hood can, I think, most readily develop.
16. In any body of legal judgments, a revaluation in terns
of justice is from time to time inevitable. But the fact that the
application of legal judgments is often entrusted to an institu-
tionalized body of expert technicians makes it likely that the
revaluation will be attempted only when conformity to a traditional
set of generalizations leads to results widely divergent frQm the
accepted sense of justice, either in its permanent elements or in
some of the more striking ones created by special circumstances
of time and place.
All this I thought I had said in "The Law as Logic and Experience".
The manner was less solemn than in the sixteen paragraphs that have
just preceded, which can be made fifteen or three or seven by anyone
who prefers these numbers. And the illustrations I selected were some-
times not as dignified as they ought to have been. For both these errors,
a now incurable tendency to frivolity is responsible. I stressed par-
ticularly the fact that any system of law in a complex community was
the historical resultant of many special and disparate developments, and
that organs devised for different things often came to be associated
and fused with those which lawyers used in order to test and declare
legal judgments. There is no reason in the world why the same methods
and terms should be used in keeping order and in adjusting family rela-
tions, as in securing payment for the delivery of goods. It is an
historical accident that it is so managed in our community. A better
acquaintance with history would make it clear to us when we are utiliz-
ing social mechanisms for the things they were originally meant to do
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and when we are attempting to do something these social mechanisms
can accomplish only clumsily and imperfectly. Sometimes we have the
distinct impression that we are cutting silk with a saw or plowing with
a sword.
But everything the court does emerges as law, and the rationalizations
and generalizations of the judgments the court announces take their
place in the body of "the law" and make it a system- although only
at the cost of a deal of modelling, fitting, adjusting and completing.
A statement like this leaves out a great many things, even many of
the things I have discussed in the book I mentioned, which is itself
little more than an essay or a group of short related essays. Can it
be called "realism"? Professor Hall doubts it, since he thinks my con-
clusion makes of me an "alleged" realist.3 I doubt it equally, not quite
for his reasons. The term "realist" has been used in politics in the evil
sense of a theory that any policy is defensible which secures political
advantage both among nations and among groups within nations.
Similarly there are lawyers- chiefly those who regard themselves as
opponents of "realism" - who think that the realist position requires
judgments to be based exclusively on a consideration of the economic
advantages of the litigants or the groups to which they belong. This
cannot be fairly said of such realists as Bingham and Liewellyn. And
in any case, I do not maintain it.
Realism proper, I should say, is a method of looking at the law with
the conviction that law directly concerns human beings, complete physical
human beings, not parts or aspects of them, not bundles of rights and
not abstract formulations however noble and inspiring. But a complete
human being is one who is likely to love liberty and his fellow-man,
to dream dreams and see visions, as well as one that prefers cake to
bread, or is wholly intent on making a substantial income by his labors.
Nor does realism ignore the function of reason- even in the form
of the decried syllogism- in making it possible to understand the law
and communicate it. Man happens to be the kind of creature who is
logical when he reflects on what he has done, even if he is not always
so when he acts. And realism equally does not ignore the aesthetic
qualities of an "elegant solution", which have more than once turned
the scale when several judgments could be equally grounded in the body
of accepted values. The living human being is fearfully and wonder-
fully made and his constituent elements are not wholly digestive juices
and blood corpuscles.
I hope I can justify my right to be called a realist in this sense,
but I should have to bear with equanimity a sentence of excommunica-
tion by real realists if this profession of faith seems to them evidence
3. Hall, review of RADiN, LAYw As LOGIC AND Exrn-Emrcr (1940) in (1941) 26
IowA L. REv. 915-918.
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of damnable heresy. I do not mind being called a naive realist, to use
Professor Patterson's words, since even he is willing to. believe that
labels are not important.4
Professor Hall holds it against me that I make law wholly a matter
of language, so that lawyers become merely philologists, expert in the
use of that language. Well, if it were so, lawyers would have them-
selves to thank for it, and I think it is so to the extent that no pro-
fessional group can avoid a technical terminology. But I hoped I had
made plain that it was of the essence of legal science to understand the
limitation of terminology and to avoid taking any term to be a fixed
and rigid constant composed of atomic invariables. If lawyers were
really philologists, they would be less afraid of the words they had
created for their convenience of intercommunication, and be less likely
to fall down and worship their handiwork.
But I suppose what Professor Hall chiefly objects to is my disin-
clination to take the law as a coherent body of rational principles which,
as such, can direct our actions. The only possible plea I can enter is
one of confession and avoidance.
I am not as much impressed as I should be by the fact that an eminent
Freudian like Dr. Franz Alexander thinks that the facts of psycho-
analysis show rationality and benevolence as much as irrationality.5 I am
inclined to trust my own observation of human conduct - if I said
"behavior", I should be hanged as a Watsonian - more than the con-
clusions of psycho-analysts, older or newer. And if this observation
seems to show that the majority of our actions are, for the most part, not
the results of rational consideration but are instinctive or habitual, it
doubtless proves that I have not met the right sort of people. But
I have seen a great many. By "irrational", of course, I do not mean
foolish or malevolent. Speaking as an Aristotelian, I make bold to say
that the confusion of contradictories and contraries has done serious
harm to law.
When I read Dr. Aronson's review of the volume in question,0 I have
the puzzled feeling that he cannot quite be speaking of that book, but
of a book I should have written if I had been a consistent empiricist
or hedonist- he believes me to profess either or both doctrines. Where
in the book do I speak of a " 'pleasure-theory' of justice" ?7 Doubtless
4. Quoted by Professor Hall, id. at 916.
5. Professor Patterson's review appeared in (1941) 41 COL. L. REv. 562-566. One
cannot escape the impression that labels mean more to Professor Patterson than he
consciously admits. Otherwise it is hard to see why he makes a list of these enter-
taining devices while professing to disdain them. The grammarians called this "preterl-
tion". Shall we say that Professor Patterson is the head of the preteritional school?
6. Aronson, review of RADiN, LAW As LoGiC AND EXPEIIENCE (1940) in (1941) 20
Tax. L. Rav. 118-125.
7. Id. at 124.
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I do, since Dr. Aronson found it there, but my own researches have been
less successful. And since the ex-perience to which I refer is, by defini-
tion and frequent illustration, an e-perience that has filtered through
generations and is checked by critical examination, and is never the
experience of one man, I do not feel that the charge that I am guilty
of a sort of inverted subjectivism is overwhelmingly established.
About inconsistency I will not quarrel with Dr. Aronson. He quotes
a passage, which I think is quite correctly taken as characteristic, in
which I decline to find a single formula, a single right method, a single
key for the law. "What is sauce for the goose," he says, "is decidedly
not sauce for the gander in this philosophy."" Quite so. It is not even
necessarily sauce for geese. So, while I think present-day police and
judges are less competent persons than present-day criminologists to
deal with criminals - I am enough of a Lombrosian to prefer to be
concerned with the delinquente than the delitto- I still think present-
day judges are more competent than present-day criminologists to deter-
mine whether or not a man is a criminal. Whether that will be so
when judges become philosophers or scientists become avare of the
meaning of the Bill of Rights, I do not know.
Since I painfully explain that the same legal mechanism is called
upon to apply values of widely different sources, I am at a loss to know
what inconsistency there is in saying that matters of different origin
are not made generically alike by being placed in the same field of
operation. But Dr. Aronson is a consistent idealist which means, I
suppose, that he has direct acquaintance with certain entities like right
and wrong, and that he strongly feels, once these are examined, a con-
sistent method of dealing with conduct is obtainable.
I hope I have never said that ideas like wrong and right, or any ideas,
are worthless or meaningless terms. Or even that in any one generation
or community they are altogether fluid and shifting. I do nonetheless
feel that they are human expressions, suggestive and directive rather
than solid creations. I can easily understand that, to those who move
easily among archetypes, examination of human values that are colored
and shaded by human wants and human needs is trivial and dispiriting.
It is, however, the best that doctrines like the ones I advocate permit.
Dr. Felix Cohen9 is both a logician and a lawyer and brings to any
study a combination of talents that would be hard to surpass. If I
say I do not think he has quite got what I meant to set forth, I am more
than willing to feel that the fault is mine. Dr. Cohen is strongly of the
opinion that law is more than "a mode of judicial dealing with contracts,
collisions and homicides". I cannot imagine any one contradicting this
S. Ibid.
9. Dr. Felix S. Cohen's review appeared in (1941) 54 Hmv. L. Rmv. 711-714.
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self-evident assertion. Indeed, my complaint is that our judicial mech-
anism deals with rather too many than with too few forms of conflict.
The point, labored somewhat at large in the text, is that the conflicts
are not the substance of the law but tests for determining what the
law is. If no one had ever broken through another's close, we should
not know the extent and limitation of the right of an owner to exclude
others. The various instances, as they happened, got rationalized and
organized into a statement of the law on the subject. It would be quite
incorrect to say that physics is a scientific way of dealing with experi-
ments, but quite correct to say that from the experiments we determine
what the laws are that in their sum constitute physics.
The difference between law and physics is that the "laws of physics"
when discovered are likely to be fairly permanent, while the law which
is worked out by generalizations from the legal experimentation involved
in adjusting conflicts by means of courts has only a limited permanence
for some of the elements in its complex constitution and even this
limited permanence is subject to gradual modifications.
This is fundamental in the approach to law that I meant to present
and Dr. Cohen's misunderstanding of it is regrettable. Equally regret-
table is the misunderstanding of what is set forth in the book as the
function of law. He quotes the statement that "To secure a good society
. . . cannot be the purpose of law for the simple reason that it is the
purpose of the entire mechanism of political and social organs," And
he goes on to say: "Unfortunately, we are not told why law may not
pursue a purpose to which other institutions are also dedicated." We
could not be told so because clearly law may and does pursue such a
purpose. Since law is part of the entire mechanism, this is precisely
what the sentence says. If Dr. Cohen will read a little further down
on the page he cited, he will discover this fact, if the obvious meaning
of the sentence did not tell him. What is denied is that this purpose
can possibly be the peculiar task of the law, since it is also the task of
other agencies. Shall we call it a lapse on the part of an eminent logician
into the fallacy of division?
Dr. Cohen likewise stops too soon in the passage he quotes more
fully from page 146:
"Not justice or a good society, therefore, but convenience of
commercial practice, appeasement of individual quarrels, or an in-
crease of good will among competitors, if that is possible, is the
purpose of law if we examine its actual operation."
His comment is that the list is far too narrow. It is, indeed, if this
was to be taken as a full statement. How little it was intended to be
an exhaustive statement of the purposes of law can be seen from the
next sentence which runs as follows: "And to these three purposes other
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purposes can be added, such as the direction of the domestic policies of
the country in constitutional questions or the elimination of non-offenders
from the group of punishable persons." The "such as", I trust, saves
even these additions from pretending to be a final complement. If all
together these things still make my outlook seem narrow and inadequate
to Dr. Cohen - how it can be irrelevant is not altogether clear - this
can easily be remedied by adding any purpose Dr. Cohen chooses, pro-
vided it can be illustrated by a possible conflict of interests between
human beings."
I am somewhat disturbed to find the book described as a "trunlt
call for a retreat from the intellectual outposts of legal reform". That
is so extraordinary a charge in view of the whole tenor of the book
that I can only assume it is due to inadvertence. I have suggested
throughout, and especially in Part III (pages 64 et seq.), lines of devel-
opment that were, I imagined, far-reaching enough. But after all, the
main purpose of an exposition- quite undogmatic in spite of Dr.
Cohen's statement to the contrary -is surely not to plead for a reform,
either a general reform or a particular one. It may be, however, that
every effort to reform human institutions is slightly aided by those who
attempt merely to clarify our notions about what it is that is to be
reformed.'
I have dealt fully with these three reviews because all three contain
implicitly the notion that principles of law, or a principle of law, exist
independently of legal judgments and determine these judgments; for
example that neminem laedere created a law of torts and smezm cuique
a law of property. That is the real issue, even in the case of Dr. Cohen's
criticism, since, somewhat curiously in view of what he has written
elsewhere, he likewise makes of "The Law" almost a being with organs
and dimensions.
10. Dr. Cohen thinks it is my purpose to eliminate "the piffling particularity of an
ephemeral statute" (p. 5). I shall let him into a secret. The phrase 'was meant jocosely.
And I trust that he means to be jocose 'when he speaks of an assumption on my part
to offer eternal wisdom to a 'waiting world. I cannot see 'what word or phrase in any-
thing I have ever written can possibly lend itself to such an interpretation.
11. I find it difficult to connect what Dr. Cohen has to say abut criminal law 'with
what I say about it. Doubtless in Athens and to a less degree in Rome the only difference
between what we now call criminal and civil suits was a matter of proce -Jre. But
criminal law at the present time means a device for determining what persons are t
be segregated or killed in the interests of social security. That is more than a pro ce-
dural matter. When Dr. Cohen asks, "What would rules and decisions concerning
property mean if criminal penalties could not be invoked at some stage in their enforce-
ment?", the answer is of course that they would mean that in the particular community
in question-there have been such communities- those who disregarded the duty of
not meddling with the property of other persons were not punished by state agencie-.
It certainly would not mean the absence of a strong feeling and a precise sen e tf
the vralue of property.
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Principles of law are undoubted facts, but they are constantly in a
state of growth and they come into existence after longer or shorter
application of individual habits of judgment. They are compacted of
notions of ethical right, religious obligation, practical utility, logical
coherence and, often enough, more or less conscious feeling of group
solidarity. The same principle repeated verbatim in different generations
is found on analysis to be composed of these elements and others in
different proportions. Once such a composite is phrased in words, how-
ever, ind is used by a specialized group of teclnicians, logical coherence
is far too often granted a greater value than other elements in it, and
it becomes a detached and disembodied entity that is readily referred
back in time to the beginning of things.
All the principles taken together cannot be reduced to a single system,
even if we forego mathematical precision. What makes them principles
of law rather than principles of sociology or any other science, is that
a special group of technicians have developed and asserted them. This
special group is itself of multiple origin and carries into its law function
many of the impulses and purposes it had in the other function with
which some or all its members were entrusted.
Those to whom a coherent system is an indispensable way of under-
standing the law properly take issue with the book I am here attempting
to defend. Its errors and imperfections are many. Most of them are
due to the fact that almost any sentence about social institutions-
indeed, about human beings- is bound to need qualifications. It is
not enough to make the qualifications clear in one particular passage.
When the w6rds are used again, they are likely to be taken unqualifiedly
by readers who cannot reasonably be expected to deal with ordinary
books as they would with - let us say - Kant's Critiques or the Origin
of Species.
Most of those who have found it necessary to render an adverse judg-
ment on the book have done so in a frame of courteous compliments.
Their right to disagree with the ideas set forth is protected by the Fiftlh
and Fourteenth Amendments from interference by the Federal or the
State governments. It is gratifying that there have been so many reviews
and that to many scholarly and thoughtful lawyers a review of a book
like this has been the occasion of announcing a theory of their own.
I have a distinct feeling that even in subsequent volumes of the
Storrs lectures the last word will not have been said about the nature
and function of law. I feel sure that at all times there will be men
who find law to be the logical consummation of a doctrine that can be
reduced to a single principle capable of being stated in phrases bristling
with large, comfortable and abstract words. There is no combination
of abstractions out of which a good Hegelian could not make some-
thing- at the very least, a theory of law.
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And I trust there will also always be on hand some who will seek to
find law in the expressed judgments of men who have most to do with
it, especially when in any community these men are formally entrusted
with the task of dealing with law. Once we begin with men, we may
end in the broadest generalizations - abstract in the sense that they
have been taken from actual experience, but not abstract in the sense
of being removed so far from experience that they have lost the recol-
lection of their source.
The generalizations will, I think, be all the better if those who use
them are conscious of their tentative character and conscious also that
they are speaking in the last analysis of creatures that have emotional
and spiritual needs as well as physical.
